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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act.

Plaintiff prayed that the Court

declare the correlative rights and duties of ( 1) the
developer of a mountain-home subdivision and (2)

an association of lot owners within the subdivision
under the circumstances revealed by the evidence.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The Trial Court declared the rights and
duties of the parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The total tract of land to which this action
relates is delineated on Exhibit 1-P.

It consists

of 320 acres (E 1/2, Sec. 27, T 1 N, R 7 E, SLM)
of which some 100 acres, shown in red hatching
on Exhibit 1-P, had (at the times relevant to this
suit) been made the subject of subdivision plats
filed with and approved by the Summit County
Commission.

The approved plats are in evidence

as Exhibits 31-P and 32-P.

At the time of

Respondent's incorporation, September 12, 1962,
-2-

(Exhibit 9-D). no land except that within the red
hatching on Exhibit 1-P could legally be sold or
properly referred to as "Aspen Acres".

So far as

the record shows, no part of the blue hatched area
on Exhibit 1-P has ever been the subject of any
subdivision plat.

For purposes of easy reference,

the total half section will be called the "Tract", the
subdivided (red-hatched) portion of the Tract will
be called "Aspen Acres", and the unsubdivided
(blue-hatched) portion of the Tract will be called
the "Remainder".
The Tract was acquired at some time prior
to 1962 by Aspen Acres Inc. , the "Developer".
Many of the lots in Aspen Acres were sold by the
summer of 1962, and the usual problems associated
with resort communities began to arise.

Who would

assure adequate water for the homes, who would

-3-

as sure adequate road systems, who would provide garbage disposal, who would provide protection from theives and vandals?

(Exhibit 3-P)

In August of 1962, Max Bateman, the
Developer's President, called a meeting of lot
owners to induce their formation of a lot owners
association.

The Developer's lawyer had prepared.,

Articles (R-212) and addressed the lot owners on
the importance of their associating.

Basically,

the Developer's message was that it wanted to
be relieved of responsibility for water and road
system maintenance, and, if the lot owners would
form an association and assumes these responsibi
ties, the Developer would convey to the as sociatic
the rights necessary to adequate performance.
The witness who most clearly remembered the
Developer's presentation at the organizational
meeting

was

Paul

Carpenter.
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His

testimony in that regard begins at R-211 and continues for several pages.

The gist of his account

of the Developer 1 s statement is contained in this
quote from R-211-12:
"he was now divorcing himself
from those responsibilities, and
he was turning the whole thing
over to the association, for which
they would be responsible, and
along with which they would have
the rights, the powers, and
authorities to do what was necessary."
From the time of its formation, Respondent
assumed the total obligation for water and road
maintenance (Exhibit 2-P, R-216 et seq.) within
Aspen Acres.

To some degree, the nature of the

rights conveyed or intended to be conveyed was
expressed in written instruments.

For example,

the Developer conveyed water rights by deed
(Exhibit 13-P).

In March of 1963, Appellant ac-
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'
quired the Remainder from the Developer (Exhibit

16-P).

In May of 1963, the parties entered into an

agreement (Exhibit 15-P) by which Appellant agreed
to convey to Respondent all the "water rights and
water system including tanks and equipment and
rights -of-ways pertaining thereto" as soon as
Appellant acquired them in consideration of Appellant1s

I

assumption of "full responsibility in connection with
the maintenance, development and operation of such
water system (paragraph 6).
Appellant now denies execution of Exhibit
15-P, but the conduct of the parties from the
date of apparent execution has been entirely
consistent with the language of the written instrument.

Respondent has maintained the system and

has entered upon the Remainder to service the
system as if it had easements to do so.

-6-

There has

been no Appellant objection (R-217).
Finally, with regard to control of access
from the highway across the South portion of the
Remainder to Aspen Acres, there was no
Appellant-executed, written instrument establishing the Association's right to maintain a
gate at the point of departure of the access road from
the highway.

Nevertheless, immediately after the

Association was formed (Exhibit 9-D, Minutes of
September 2, 1962) its directors appointed a
committee to promulgate ground rules.

Mr.

Carpenter was the Chairman of the Ground Rules
Committee (ibid) and the rules his Committee
formulated were adopted by the directors (meeting
of October 30, 1962, Exhibit 9-D).

The Ground

Rules themselves are found in the "by-laws" Section
of Exhibit 9-D.

Rule 18 provides for a gate to con-
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trol access.

The rules were a primary subject

for discussion at a general membership meeting
of September 26, 1962.

Max Bateman, the

Developer's President was present.

The rules

were "unanimously approved" by the membership
(Exhibit 9-D).
By October 29, 1964, (Minutes of that date,
Exhibit 9-D) the gate was installed, and its
operation was discussed at a general membership
meeting of May 5, 1965, (Exhibit 9-D).

At no

time did the Developer make oral or written
objection to the Association's control of access
even though represented at the meetings when the
rules were adopted and constructively present
when the claimed right to control was exercised.
It was not until Appellant assumed the Developer's

position that the lock was sawed off and the gate
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itself was repeatedly rammed (R-224).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
HELD THAT RESPONDENT OWNS THE
WATER SYSTEM AND EASEMENTS
FOR ITS MAINTENANCE
Appellant, at page 10 of its brief, denies
that any witness recalled a promise by the Developer
to convey the water system to Respondent.

Mr.

Carpenter, however, testified that the Developer's
counsel represented, in the context of a discussion
about road and water systems, that the Developer
was "turning the whole thing over" to the Association
which would have the "rights, powers and .authorities"
to carry out its responsibilities of maintenance.
Thereafter, we have conduct over a period
of almost a decade consistent only with an under-
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II

standing that Respondent could exercise completel
dominion over the pipes, tanks and other

I
compon~

of the sys tern.
Respondent need not rely on an oral contr1
or on the implications of its continuing exercise o!.:
dominion over the system without objection.

The~
I

a written instrument, fully executed by both partii
which clearly states Appellant's obligation to convj

I

the system to Respondent.

i

Appellant argues thatll

the contract was not delivered by Appellant to
Respondent, (2) the authority to execute the argurnl
is not revealed by the Minutes of either party, (3)
Appellant's conduct after May 22, 1967, is inconsis
tent with its claim that the contract was in effect,
and (4) Appellant is

estopped to assert the contra~

We will consider these points in the order Appellam
makes them.
-10-

(1) There was delivery.
Exhibit 15 is not a deed but a contract
containing a promise to convey in the future.
Delivery is not, therefore, a concept that has
real application.

Nevertheless, Appellant pro-

duced the instrument which was in Appellant's
possession.
delivered.

It must, therefore, have been
Significantly, it was signed on the

date of one of Respondent's membership meetings
which both signators of the contract attended.
(2) Respondent can rely on the signature.
Appellant admits that Exhibit 13-P was
signed on behalf of Appellant by Walton R. Farmer
(Appellant's brief, page 15).

Mr. Farmer was,

at the time he affixed his signature, an officer and
director of Appellant (Exhibit 25-D) who dealt
for Appellant with Respondent (membership meeting
of May 22, 1963, Exhibits 29-P, 30-P).
-11-

Against

that background of apparent authority of Farmer to
act for Appellant, Appellant cannot now deny Farmer1,
authority.

In this connection, we cite 19 Am Jur

2d 590, Corporations Section 1164:
"The fundamental and wellsettled rule is that when, in the usual
course of the business of a corporation, an officer or other agent is held
out by the corporation or has been
permitted to act for it or manage its affairs in such a way as to justify third
persons who deal with him in inferring
or assuming that he is doing an act or
making a contract within the scope of
his authority, the corporation is bound
thereby, even though such officer or
agent has not the actual authority from
the corporation to do such an act or
make such a contract. "
Appellant's argument that, even if Farmer
signed the contract, he meant to keep the fact of its
execution secret but inadvertantly placed the executed
contract on the top of his car from which it was blown
by the wind (R-275) is simply not a credible story.
-12-

The witnesses merely speculated that this might
have happened; the instrument in evidence does not
appear to have been damaged by the elements; and
the record clearly shows that, on the date the
instrument bears, both signators were attending a
general membership meeting of Respondent's
members at the Utah Power & Light auditorium in
Salt Lake.

It is obvious that the instrument was

signed at that meeting.

In any event, with the fully

executed agreement in evidence and produced by
Respondent, the Trial Court was not obliged to
believe it was not intended to be executed and
delivered.
d
n

This is particularly true when there

is ( 1) such a clear trial of Minutes regarding this

..

contract in Respondent's records right up to May 20,
1963, when a special re solution authorizing this contract
inute entry that, at the May
was passe d , and ( 2) a m
-13-

22, 1963, meeting (the date of the contract), Mr.
Farmer told the members that "after they had
paid off their obligation to Mr. Bateman, they
would give the Association clear deeds and titles
to roads, water storage tanks, equipment and
lines in which they have any interest.

11

Clearly,

Mr. Farmer was telling the members about the
content of a contract he had just signed.

The

very authority Appellant cites ( 17 C. J. S. , Contract1
Section 64) for the proposition that delivery is
an essential element of contract notes that "delivery
may be actual or constructive,

11

and "a writing

not delivered may be evidence of the actual terms
of an agreement between parties. "
(3) Respondent's failure to produce Exhibit,

15-P before trial does not require its being
excluded from evidence.
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On July 22, 1971, some two months
before the trial, Respondent answered interrogatories in a manner which establishes that
Respondent's then president either (a) did not
know of the existence of the agreement which
was introduced as Exhibit 15-P or (b) was not
aware that paragraph 6 of that agreement bore
directly on the is sues in the suit.
It must be admitted that, in the prepara-

tion for trial, all the documents in Respondent's
files were scrutinized more carefully than they
were for purposes of responding to interrogatories.

Exhibit 15-P must be read fully and

carefully before its relevance is recognized.

In

any event, the facts about the late discovery of
the document or its relevance were revealed to
the trial judge before trial commenced, and the
-15-

document can hardly have surprised Appellant;
it bore the signatures of two of Appellant's
officers or ex-officers.
Appellant has called this Court's attention\,
to three cases and one text which support the
proposition that a trial judge is justified in
drawing inferences from the failure of a party to
produce a witness to refute adverse testimony
the witness is in that party's control.

whe~

None of the

authorities would impose upon any Court an
obligation totally to discredit evidence as relevant
as Exhibit 15-P merely because the party seeking
to introduce it could not explain the circumstances
of its execution and delivery.
In the instant case, of course, it is simply
not true that Resporrlent could produce witnesses
who could testify about how Exhibit 15-P came to
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be in Respondent's possession.

The two people

who signed it were among the founders of the
Appellant corporation, and both were adverse
witnesses.

What the record does show is that

(a) the Exhibit was in Respondent's possession

at the time of trial, (b) the signatures are
entirely authentic, (c) Respondent's Minutes
are laden with authority for its execution, (d)
Appellant's Minutes show no action between
May 8, 1963, and September 3, 1963, but
Appellant's witness, Kenneth Stahr, testified
(R-265) that Exhibit 15-P was "prepared by
Mr. Farmer" acting for Appellant, and (e)
Appellant's Minutes do not show any official
corporate consideration and rejection of the
argument.
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(4)

The state of the two sets of corporate

Minutes and other records does not justify or
require a conclusion that Exhibit 15-P is not valid
and enforceable.
Appellant has devoted appreciable space
in its brief to comment on the absence of Minute
entry authority for the execution of Exhibit 15-P.
With regard to Respondent, of course, there is a
special resolution, dated May 20, 1963, covering
the terms of the agreement.

Appellant's Minutes

are entirely sitent on the subject, even though Mr.
Stahr testified that some form of agreement was
formally discussed by Appellant's directors on
May 8.

At some time, Mr. Stahr made a hand-

written notation on Exhibit 17 that Appellant's
directors had rejected Respondent's proposal as
framed on May 8; there is no notation or Minute
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entry anywhere, however, to the effect that
Respondent's proposal as framed on May 20 was
rejected.

The evidence of Appellant's witnesses

is, in fact, that Mr. Farmer acting for Appellant
prepared the agreement which was signed and that
both signatures on the document are authentic.
The mere fact that a Minute entry
authorizing Mr. Farmer to sign Exhibit 15-P for
Appellant cannot be located does not invalidate
the contract.

It is obvious that Appellant's

records are incomplete; there are no Minutes
of the May 8, 1963, meeting, for example.
Moreover, Appellant did not always act by corporate resolution in making contracts.

There

is not, so far as we can determine, even a
corporate resolution authorizing Appellant's
purchase of the Remainder from the Developer.
-19-

The law applicable to the situation is,
even if the agreement were oral, adequately
stated in the following excerpts from Sections
960 and 961 of the American Jurisprudence
Treatise on Corporations { 19 Am Jur 2d 438,

4J~

"Generally speaking, the assent
of the directors of a corporation is
necessary to validate a corporate act,
but it is not always essential to action
by the corporation that it be in pursuance
of a formal resolution of the board of
directors, since corporations, as well
as individuals, may be bound by implication."
"The acts of a corporation, in
other respects rightfully transacted,
a re not invalid because not reduced to
writing, unless a statute makes such
writing indispensable as evidence or to
give the acts an obligatory force. Except
where otherwise required by statute, a
corporation may enter into parol contracts and engagements the same as an
individual. Thus, a corporate agent
may be appointed by parol. It has also
been held that a transfer of the assets,
good will, and property of a corporation
may be effectually made by parol, where
-20-

a writing is not expressly required
by statute. Indeed, even though the
statute provides that the corporation
shall contract only in writing, no
matter how positive or peremptory
the language may be, it does not
avoid an executed contract of which
the corporation has received the
benefit. Moreover, the acts of corporations are presumed to be regular
until the contrary appears. Furthermore, although the corporation has
failed to comply with some formality
or regulation which it should not have
neglected, but which has in fact been
omitted after both parties to the
transaction have acted and proceeded
as if all preliminary formalities and
regulations had been complied with,
and rights have attached, the corporation
itself cannot be heard to set up the
informality. 11

(5} Respondent's conduct has not been inconsistent with its claim that an agreement embodying essentially the terms of Exhibit 15-P
was in effect between the parties.

-21-

It should be remembered that this litiga-

tion was not commenced as an effort to enforce
Exhibit 15-P.

The Complaint asks the Court to

declare the rights of the parties 1 under a set of
circumstances of which the execution of the
agreement is only one.

At the time the Complaint

was filed, Respondent was obviously unaware
that the promise to convey the water system had
been reduced to writing.

No mention of the contra1

was made in the Complaint.

Basically, RespondeD

alleges that its members assumed responsibility
for maintenance of road and water systems in
consideration of the Developer's promise to "turn
over" those systems and clothe Respondent with
adequate authority to as sure road and water
service to Aspen Acres lot owners.
Nothing Respondent has done at any time
-22-

is inconsistent with its claim that the Developer
(and Appellant as successor to the Developer)
has the obligation to keep its promise.

That

promise is the same whether written or oral
express or implied.

'

The Trial Court simply

nt

declared that the promise was made and is
enforceable.
POINT II
:a1

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT HAD
THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ACCESS
TO ASPEN ACRES FROM
THE HIGHWAY
Without question, on the evidence, Respondent has since 1963, assumed the responsibility
for the maintenance of the means of access from
the public highway across the South portion of
the Remainder to Aspen Acres.

The Trial Court

recognized an easement in favor of the lot owners
-23-

along that access route and, with regard to
that easement, declared that Respondent, as
trustee for Aspen Acres lot owners, has the
right to exercise reasonable controls over the
use oi the road.
The evidence on the subject is, of
course, that, immediately after the formal
proceedings which culminated in the formation
of Respondent and during which the Developer
made certain promises about the rights
Respondent would be afforded, Respondent
prepared "ground rules" including those
which involved control of use of the access road.
These rules were unanimously approved at
a general membership meeting attended by the
Developer.

Thereafter, without objection from

the Developer, a gate was installed at the highway.
-24-

Shortly after Appellant succeeded to the
Developer's interest, we have the lock being
sawed off, the gate being rammed, and the
right of control asserted by Appellant being
violated or denied.

Respondent attempted to

negotiate a resolution of the problem and,
when negotiations failed, sought a Judicial
declaration of rights.
The Trial Court concluded that this
right of reasonable control (over the roadway
Respondent was obligated to maintain) was
(a) specifically promised as a part of the
consideration for Respondent's assumption
of the maintenance responsibility or (b)
established as a facet of Respondent's role
by the conduct of the parties, or (c) implied
by the circumstances as necessary for
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Respondent's effective performance of its
obligations.
It is clearly the law that, where an

easement is expressly or impliedly granted
and the particulars of the easement are not
stated, the location, extent, and manner of
use are established by the conduct of the
parties.

This point of law should require

no extensive citation of authorities.

We would

refer the Court, however, to 25 Arn Jur 2d,
474 to 480, Easements, Section 67, 73 and 74.
The conduct of the parties (i.e. , the Developer
and Respondent) in this case, until Appellant
succeeded to the Developer's position,
established the location, extent, and manner
of use to be exactly what the Trial Court declared them to be.
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Appellant suggests, at page 26 of its
brief, that Max Bateman was not really acting for
the Developer in his intercourse with Respondent
and its founders.

The record will not support any

such speculation.

The lot owners dealt with Max

Bateman as the Developer's president, the same
capacity in which he acted when he sold them their
lots.

In this connection, we call the Court's

attention to Section 6-E-5 of Summit County
Ordinance 58 ( 1967) which requires the subdivider
to cause a lot owners association to be formed.
It was obviously as the subdivider that Mr.

Bateman was acting; he was providing for
the performance of a subdivider's promise and,
in fact, doing what the law now requires subdividers to do.
Appellant next suggests that Respondent

-27-

is some kind of volunteer, representing a
minority of lot owners and without status to
assert any rights on behalf of lot owners as
a class.

In that regard, the Trial Court

concluded that associations like Re3pondent
are absolutely necessary if owners of lots
within a subdivision like Aspen Acres are
to realize any real benefits from ownership.

It

is always true that some lot owners will avoid
contributing to the costs of providing services
if they can enjoy those services without paying.

Thil? fact is, however, that this Association
does represent many
---

lot owners and has

--

assumed the total responsibility for road and
water system maintenance since 1963 under
contract with the Developer.

Associations

like Respondent~ not without status and are

-28-

not anomolies.

Section 6-E-5 of Summit

County Ordinance 58, to which we have heretofore referred, reads in part as follows:
a. As assurance of maintenance of the common open space
and other improvements where so
required the subdivider shall cause
to be formed, prior to the recording of
the final plat, a Lot Owners Association and shall establish articles of
incorporation of the Association, bylaws and covenants outlining the
purpose, organization and operation
of the Association.
b. Such articles of incorporation and covenants shall, among other
things, provide:
1.

That membership shall be
mandatory for each lot
purchaser and any successive
buyer.

2.

That Common Open Space
restrictions must be permanent, not just for a
period of years.

-29-

3.

That the Association must
be responsible for liability
insurance, local taxes and
I
the maintenance of recreation.!
al and other facilities.

I

4.

That lot owners must pay
their pro rata share of the
costs.

5.

That the assessment levied
by the Association shall become a lien against the property.

6.

That the Association must
be able to adjust the assessment to meet changed needs.

We cannot conceive that this Court will find an
association formed as this Ordinance contemplate!
to be without authority to act for lot owners.
Obviously, if the majority of lot owners
want all controls lifted from the use of the access
road, if they want motorcycles and snowmobiles
using their lots freely, if they want the public to
-30-

enjoy the subdivision's common area, if they
enjoy seeing cars parked on the bridge and
blocking the access, if they feel that thieves
should have an easy way of getting to and
from subdivision homes, then those lot owners
can join the Association.
become the corporate will.

Their will must
In the circum-

stances, however, we submit that the
Judiciary should not waste sympathy on lot
.owners who will not pay for road and water
maintenance and insist on practices which increase the costs of such maintenance.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO DECLARE A
RIGHT IN APPELLANT TO USE
SUBDIVISION ROADS FREELY
The nature of the easement in roads
within the subdivision is set forth very speci-
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fically in the deeds by which the Developer
has sold Aspen Acres' lots.

The Trial Court

construed the language, and Appellant presents
no compelling reason for a different construction.

It is obvious that the Developer's use

of subdivision roads for the purpose of moving
heavy equipment onto the Remainder imposes
a burden well beyond what was contemplated by
the lot owners when they bought or Respondent
when it assumed the burdens of road maintenance.
Appellant argues for an easement of
necessity.

It is not clear from Exhibit 1-P

that Appellant does not have a means of access
to the North part of the Remainder along the
West boundary of the Tract.

In any event,

"way of necessity" concept has never been
-32-

applied to reserve to a subdivider an easement
in all the roads of a subdivision.

If the concept

has any application at all, the implied way
should be along the West route which involves
the least disruption within Aspen Acres.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL GOUR T DID NOT
ERR IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT
ASSUMED THE DEVELOPER'S
OBLIGATIONS
The contract by which Appellant acquired
the Remainder is in evidence as Exhibit 16-P.

It is clear from that contract that Appellant
knew of the existence of Aspen Acres Subdivision
and was acquiring, besides the Remainder, "all
of the right, title and interest of the seller or
Ma:X Bateman in Aspen Acres. "

The Trial

Court concluded that the obligations of a sub-
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divider pass with the land when the subdivision
is sold.

We submit that no other conclusion

which accords with popular understanding and
general practice is possible.

CONCLUSION
The instant case presents issues
which will undoubtedly recur as Utah 1 s mountain
resort areas are developed.

Associations of

lot owners are the only practical means by
which assurance of good water and access can
be provided.

In this case, Respondent asked for

a declaration of its rights under circumstances
which have been exhaustively explored.
The Trial Court has, in our view, in-
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corporated sensible, practical and legally
supportable guidelines in its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.

The judgment

should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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